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The exchange rate regimes and policies adopted by the East European countries and by the successor states of the Soviet Union have been, like many other aspects of transition, the subject of considerable controversy. Nevertheless, the transition experience does serve as a valuable opportunity for reexamining the assumptions that underlie much of the policy advice that has been lavished on the region and as an impetus for refining our understanding of important economic processes. Each paper in this symposium addresses either directly or indirectly the following question. Did the countries in transition choose an exchange rate regime that was appropriate for facilitating the reorientation of their trade toward world markets and, once having selected that regime, did they implement the 1 I am indebted to the National Council for Eurasian Research for support of the research underlying this paper. macroeconomic, exchange rate and commercial policies that were consistent with, and appropriate for, that exchange rate regime? 2 Desai's (1998) contribution shows the variety of exchange rate regimes adopted by transition economies and clearly maps out the surprising commonalities in the experiences that these countries have had despite the differences in exchange rate regime adopted. The most striking of these commonalities is the time path of the exchange rate in the course of transition. Most countries began the transition process with a sharp nominal and real depreciation of their currency; this was followed by real appreciation as domestic inflation outstripped subsequent nominal depreciation over the course of transition. While Desai attributes much of the real appreciation to fiscal imbalances in the transition economies, she also reflects on the excessive undervaluation of the currencies of the transition economies. She suggests that, irrespective of individual countries' fiscal balance, undervaluation is being rectified through increases in domestic prices that arise, over time, as a result of the undervaluation of the currency.
3 The implication, then, is that the exchange rates of transition economies may not be set at their long-run equilibrium levels, and the real appreciation of these countries' currencies, and especially of the countries that have achieved some measure of domestic fiscal balance, can be seen as a movement of the exchange rate toward its long-run equilibrium.
Indeed, each of the papers in the symposium touches on the question of undervaluation or overvaluation of the currency of the country or countries examined. In his analysis of the Czech exchange rate crisis of 1997, Begg (1998) shows the real appreciation of the koruna in the years leading up to the crisis and that, at the time of the crisis, the koruna was still somewhat undervalued. Szapáry and Jakab (1998) view Hungarian exchange rate policy from this perspective. Even Drabek and Brada (1998) , who claim to eschew the issue of under-or overvaluation, eventually are forced to address it in their analysis of how commercial policy has been used to offset the real appreciation of currencies in transition economies.
Despite the emphasis that analyses of transition economies place on the large initial depreciation of these countries' currencies and on the effect of their subsequent real appreciation on international competitiveness, the quantitative evidence on either of these related issues is quite problematic. The conventional wisdom's acceptance of these propositions has much more to do with the fact that the experience of transition economies fits in rather neatly, although perhaps too neatly, with economic notions that hold considerable intuitive appeal. The most frequently cited evidence for the undervaluation of transition economies' currencies is the comparison of official and purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. PPP doctrine suggests that, at least for tradables, prices in different countries should, through commodity arbitrage, tend toward equality, so that the exchange rate between two currencies in the long run ensures that the same bundle of goods will cost the same in the two countries. 4 Thus, if the same bundle of goods does not cost the same amount of money when converted at the existing exchange rate, we can view one currency as undervalued or the other as overvalued. Table 1 reports nominal and PPP exchange rates for several transition economies; these data are typical of the evidence used to show the undervaluation of these countries' currencies.
How much stock one wishes to place in the kind of data presented in Table 1 depends on two things. The first is whether PPP should hold exactly or approximately between transition economies and countries such as the United States or Germany. In fact, PPP holds under extremely restrictive conditions (Wolf, 1985, pp. 2-10) , and these conditions are unlikely to be met in the case of the transition economies for reasons well described by Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) . 5 The second problem is whether PPP exchange rates presented for the transition economies in Table 1 are good measures of the purchasing power of foreign currencies when converted into the currencies of the transition economies. A good PPP exchange rate between, say, the dollar and the Czech koruna would be one that obtained the identical bundle of goods in the United States and in the Czech Republic for the same amount of money. Most of the estimates of PPP exchange rates are based on the work of the International Comparison Program (ICP) (Summers and Heston, 1991) . Benchmark PPPs are compiled only infrequently and reported with significant lags. In the interim, researchers interpolate and update old PPP estimates using other data on price movements. Thus, it is questionable whether PPP exchange rates obtained in this way can really capture with any adequacy the major changes in consumption baskets, in product quality, and in the availability of goods without the queuing or bribes that characterized the pretransition regimes of East Europe and Russia.
There is a second problem with PPP exchange rate estimates of the transition economies. An examination of the estimates over time reveals a continuity of the PPP rate between the pre-and posttransition periods when adjustment is made for the monetary shocks involved. This suggests that biases in the PPP exchange rate from the prereform period may also characterize the estimates for the transition period. Indeed, after extensive study, the World Bank declined to convert East European GDPs using PPP exchange rates because of doubts about the validity of the PPP exchange rate estimates for these countries in the 1980s. In his analysis of the pretransition period, Wolf (1985) concluded that there are "doubts . . . with respect to ICP accounting for CPE trade balances, and as to whether quality differentials for manufactures as between CPEs and market economies are adequately taken into account." Clearly, if the ICP overestimated the quality of goods in the centrally planned economies, then their PPP exchange rate also tended to be overstated. To the extent that this bias carried over to the transition period due to the infrequent gathering of ICP data and the consequent needed to extrapolate from base years, it may well be that the PPP exchange rates to which the nominal exchange rates of transition economies are compared in Table 1 are too high, thus overstating the degree of undervaluation of these currencies.
Some corroborating evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the so-called Big Mac Index compiled by The Economist. Rather than utilizing a market basket of commodities to derive PPP, this index relies on a single, homogeneous commodity, i.e., McDonald's Big Mac hamburger. Despite this seemingly whimsical choice of a reference commodity, both The Economist and academic researchers suggest that it does a reasonable job of measuring both absolute and relative PPP.
6 Table 2 provides measures of undervaluation of some transition economies' currencies, and these indicate a much smaller degree of undervaluation than suggested by Table 1 for some countries, including the Czech Repub-lic, while generally corroborating the results of Table 1 for others. Of course, one may argue, Big Macs are a "Western good" and thus overpriced in transition economies where they are seen as a novelty. This may be true, but it also reflects the fact that such Western goods do have a higher quality than did domestic goods, suggesting an overvaluation of pre-, and perhaps posttransition economies' currencies by the ICP method. Moreover, Ong (1997) adjusted the Big Mac index to account for international productivity differentials because nontradables account for 94% of the Big Mac's price. Once this adjustment is made for the two transition economies in her sample, Hungary and Russia, the undervaluation of their currency is reduced even more.
Given the conceptual problems with PPP comparisons and with the actual means of computing PPP exchange rates and in view of the wide range of the estimates of PPP exchange rates, it would be prudent in our discussions of exchange rate policies in transition economies not to ascribe a false measure of precision to the sort of comparisons implied by the data in Table 1 .
There is also the implicit assumption in some of the discussion of transition economies' exchange rate policies that real appreciation toward the PPP exchange rate is natural and desirable because the PPP rate is the long run equilibrium rate. Even if there were no doubt about the validity of the PPP values toward which these currencies are appreciating, it is unlikely that the equilibrium exchange rate for these economies is either a static target or one well captured by the PPP exchange rate. Most transition economies have undergone major reforms, all of which have had appreciable consequences for their equilibrium exchange rate. For example, many of these countries moved very rapidly from a system of state trading that was, in effect, a complex system of unstated tariffs and subsidies to a trading system characterized by few trade restrictions and low tariff rates (Cooper, 1997) . As Drabek and Brada (1998) point out, trade barriers are used to support overvalued currencies, and thus trade liberalization should lead to a lower equilibrium exchange rate. For many of the transition economies, such trade liberalization has come about not only through the initial revision of the tariff but also through ongoing liberalization as part of their relations with the EC or with regional integration schemes such as that among the Visegrad Source: The Economist, March 1994 , 1995 , September, 1996 , December, 1997 countries. Offsetting this to some extent is the tightening of commercial policy in times of worsening balance of trade deficits. Transition has also brought about important changes in production and productivity, and these changes should also influence the equilibrium rate. Gains in productivity lead to an appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate. Begg (1998) presents some evidence on the productivity gains in the Czech Republic and finds them to be modest at best. To some extent, however, this may be due to statistical shortcomings in the measurement of aggregate output. There is a considerable literature that argues that the measured fall in output suffered by transition economies overstates or distorts reality (see, e.g., Winiecki, 1991; Sachs and Lipton, 1991) . Thus, when adjusted for its social usefulness and quality, output in transition economies may be higher than suggested by official statistics, implying a higher growth of productivity than the official statistics suggest and, by implication, an appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate. 7 Finally, all of the transition economies have liberalized their capital accounts. To the extent that this has attracted capital inflows, it has appreciated the equilibrium exchange rate. Table 3 provides some evidence on the risk associated with lending to transition economies. Over time, the absolute level of risk assocaited with lending to these countries has declined as indicated by the increase in the numerical rating of their creditworthiness as measured by Euromoney between 1993 and 1997. For a number of them, their rank relative to other countries increased as well, at least through 1996. This improvement in Source: Euromoney, March 1994 , 1995 , September, 1996 , December, 1997 creditworthiness, if combined with a constant risk premium on their interest rates, should thus have led to some appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate by stimulating capital inflows. Table 4 presents some imperfect data on interest rates and returns from lending to transition economies. The imperfection lies from using deposit rates as the reference return on investing in different countries because spreads between deposit and lending rates were considerably greater in East Europe than in developed market economies. 8 Noteworthy is the large decline in Polish and Hungarian yields to dollar and DM investors and the robustness and growth of the Czech returns for dollar investors despite improving creditworthiness. This graphically illustrates one of the reasons for the large inflows of short-term capital into the Czech Republic as described by Begg (1998) .
Even the partial evidence presented here suggests that the experience of all transition economies with respect to productivity growth, trade liberalization, and capital inflows has not been the same. Thus, equilibrium exchange rates may have appreciated or depreciated over time for these countries, even as their nominal rates seem to have moved toward their PPP rates. This uniformity of convergence toward the PPP rate among transition economies is all the more curious when we consider that such convergence, at least in the post-Bretton Woods period, is hard to discern among developed market economies. Indeed, the evidence from these economies suggests that, if there is long term convergence of exchange rates toward PPP, it is punctuated by large fluctuations induced by monetary shocks. If we accept Begg's (1998) evidence of slow productivity growth in the Czech Republic as characteristic of other transition economies, then Desai's (1998) evidence of the very different fiscal and monetary policies to be found among the transition economies suggests that monetary shocks should predominate over productivity shocks in both frequency and intensity. Therefore, the path of exchange rates in transition economies ought to be more varied, with a few countries following a path that reflects mainly the effect of real shocks while others follow a path reflecting large monetary shocks. Thus, the similarity of the evolution of exchange rates in transition economies and its consistency with the predictions of purchasing power parity doctrine may be less of a cause for comfort than we now believe.
